The present study aims to elucidate the foundations of the prohibition of torture in Islamic jurisprudence and to analyze it in comparison with relevant international legal instruments. Islamic jurisprudence, drawing upon Qur’anic texts, Prophetic tradition, and principles of ijtihād, prohibits torture on the basis of doctrinal rules such as the prohibition of harm (ḥurmat al-īdhā’), the lā ḍarar principle, and the inadmissibility of coerced confessions. Conversely, the international legal system—through instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention against Torture—establishes a defined framework for the prohibition of torture. Employing a comparative analytical method, this article examines the structure, foundations, and obligations of both systems, assessing their points of convergence and divergence in terms of conceptual scope, implementation, and evidentiary standards. The findings indicate that each legal framework, grounded in its own normative foundations, meaningfully rejects torture. Comparative study of the two systems thus facilitates a more precise understanding of their differences and areas of overlap, without presupposing any normative hierarchy between them.