The reattachment of an organ severed as a result of implementing ḥadd or qiṣāṣ is a subject within criminal jurisprudence. This issue—though with slight variations—has a relatively old precedent in Islamic legal thought. The permissibility of reattaching an amputated organ following the execution of ḥadd or qiṣāṣ has been a point of significant juristic disagreement, rooted in differing interpretations of the objectives of these punishments as well as the evidence and legal foundations upon which they are based. Each viewpoint, relying on textual sources, legal proofs, and even principles of uṣūl and rational arguments, attempts to substantiate and reinforce its position.
Among the expressed opinions, the majority view—well-known and supported by substantial evidence among both Jaʿfarī and Ḥanafī jurists—holds that reattachment of an organ severed through the implementation of ḥadd or qiṣāṣ is impermissible, or at the very least requires precaution regarding its permissibility. Although the opposing view, which allows reattachment, as well as the view that distinguishes between organs severed under ḥadd and those severed under qiṣāṣ, each presents its own arguments and evidence, all these positions have supporters among jurists of both schools and rely on similar or partially overlapping reasoning to justify their conclusions.
This study employs a descriptive–analytical and library based method: it first presents an overview of the existing juristic opinions on the matter and then examines the feasibility and permissibility of such reattachment. The aim of the article is to assess, from a jurisprudential perspective, whether reattaching an organ severed through ḥadd or qiṣāṣ is permissible, valid, or prohibited.